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International Legal Practice Involving
England and New York Following
Adoption of the United Kingdom Legal
Services Act 2007

Sydney M. Cone, III*
This article deals with the regulation of legal services in England and
New York in the context of, first, multidisciplinary practice ("MDP")1 and,
second, permitted investment in legal practice. The article summarizes both
the background of and potential differences between the regulations in those
two jurisdictions, and comments on the possible reconciliation of those
differences. Because, chronologically, New York was the first of the two
jurisdictions under consideration to adopt rules on MDP, the New York
rules will be considered first, and the more recent statute, known as the
United Kingdom Legal Services Act 2007 2(hereinafter "U.K. Act"), will
then be considered as it applies to England. The article will then analyze
the implications of the New York and English rules for international legal
practice involving the two jurisdictions.
I. NEW YORK AND MDP
In June 1999, a commission created by the American Bar Association
recommended that lawyers in the United States be permitted to participate
with non-lawyers in the creation of business entities owned or controlled by
non-lawyers; the purpose of this recommendation was to permit US.

* C.V. Starr Professor of Law and Director, Center for International Law, New York Law
School; Senior Counsel, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. Copyright © 2007 Sydney
M. Cone, III.
Depending on the context, as used herein "multidisciplinary practice" or "MDP"
signifies either activities involving two or more disciplines, or an enterprise engaging in such
activities.
2 The U.K. Act generally applies only to England and Wales. Legal Services Act, 2007,
c. 29, § 212 (Eng.). It is to "come into force on such day as may be appointed by order of
the Lord Chancellor." Id. § 211.
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lawyers to engage in multidisciplinary practice. The following year, the
ABA House of Delegates in effect rejected this recommendation.4
Meanwhile, the New York State Bar Association had also been considering
questions relating to MDP and investment by non-lawyers in law firms.
The result in New York was the coming into force on November 1, 2001 of
two new Disciplinary Rules and eighteen related Ethical Considerations.
The first of New York's Disciplinary Rules on MDP deals with
lawyers or law firms providing non-legal services to clients or other
persons,6 and the second of these Rules provides for contractual
relationships between lawyers and non-legal professionals. 7 Briefly put, the
reasons for these two rules were, respectively: to recognize that the practice
of law involves not only legal services, but also services ancillary thereto as
seen from the perspective of the client; and to recognize that clients can
benefit from contractual relationships among professionals if the
relationships are subject to appropriate ethical standards.
When these two rules were under consideration, a significant
possibility existed that major accounting firms would enter into important
categories of legal practice in the United States much as these firms had
done outside the United States, a development that these firms likened to
multidisciplinary practice.8 Commentary on this development formed part
of the background of the two New York rules mentioned above. A general
comment was to the effect that a distinction should be recognized between,
on the one hand, an MDP signifying professionals who are subject to codes
of conduct and who work closely together, and, on the other hand, "giant
business conglomerates that manage and market multiple product lines." 9
Particular comments dealt with MDP as it had developed in certain
countries. It was noted, for example, that large accounting firms seemed to
3 NEW YORK STATE BAR ASS'N SPECIAL COMM. ON THE LAW GOVERNING FIRM
STRUCTURE AND OPERATION, PRESERVING THE CORE VALUES OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROFESSION: THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

1 (Apr. 2000) [hereinafter N.Y. REPORT], available at http://www.law.comell.edu/ethics
/mdp.htm. (The author of this Article was a Vice-Chairman of the Special Committee.)
4 See John Gibeaut, "It's a Done Deal": House of Delegates Vote Crushes Chancesfor

MDP, 86 A.B.A. J. 92 (Sept. 2000).
5 See generally the N.Y. REPORT, supra note 3. Much of the drafting of New York's two
new Disciplinary Rules and related Ethical Considerations mentioned in the next sentence of
the text was based on pages 336-59 of the N.Y. REPORT.
6 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 1200.5-b [DR 1-106] (McKinney 2008) [hereinafter DR 1-106]; N.Y.
JUD. LAW app. EC 1-9-1-12 (McKinney Supp. 2008).
7 N.Y. JuD. LAW § 1200.5-c [DR 1-107] (McKinney 2008) [hereinafter DR 1-107]; N.Y.
JuD. LAW app. EC 1-13-1-18 (McKinney Supp. 2008).
8 See Sydney M. Cone, III, Views on Multidisciplinary Practice with Particular
Reference to Law and Economics, New York and North Carolina,36 WAKE FOREST L. REv.

1, 3, 7-10 (Spring 2001).
9 N.Y. REPORT, supra note 3, at 152.
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have found France to be a favorable country in which to "experiment" with
MDP, and that the preferred approach in France was for an accounting firm
to enter into an "arrangement" with an "associated law firm" that remained
nominally independent. 10
The tenor of these comments seems to have informed the two rules
that came into force in New York on November 1, 2001. First of all, New
York seemingly intended to focus on the professional aspects of MDP,
including the codes of conduct governing professional practice, and to
eschew "MDP" that was not so much an exercise in professionalism as a
mechanism for mass marketing. Secondly, New York, when it looked at
MDP as it had evolved in, for example, France, seemingly took note of the
realities of MDP where that term signified legal professionals who, rather
than being merged into a conglomerate dominated by forces outside the
legal profession, were allowed to retain a degree of independence when
they affiliated with other professionals.
Against this background, the two New York rules adopted in 2001 will
be analyzed in the dual context in which they were developed. At the level
of ethical professional behavior, the crafting of these two rules could not
avoid taking into account the overall pattern of professional rules, including
commentary and decisions bearing thereon, applicable to the attorney-client
relationship and the responsibilities of members of the legal profession."
At the level of the realities of legal practice, the drafters of the two rules
used language that reflects awareness of, for example, the views of the
recipients of legal and non-legal services, and the potential vulnerability of
lawyers to being influenced on professional
matters by persons not subject
2
profession.'
legal
the
governing
rules
to
The first of the two New York rules adopted in 2001 recognizes that,
in the ordinary course of legal practice, lawyers and law firms will on
occasion find it appropriate and even necessary to provide clients with
services that are ancillary to the practice of law but that, strictly speaking,
are not legal services. New York Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 1-106 and
related Ethical Considerations 3 were added to the Code of Professional
Responsibility in 2001 to take such ancillary services into account.
Analyzed as a rule dealing with MDP, DR 1-106 can be said to govern an
MDP controlled by lawyers.
Governing as it does an MDP controlled by lawyers and, perforce, by
persons themselves subject to the lawyers' professional code, DR 1-106 sets
out only the requirements deemed necessary under those circumstances.
'01 Id. at 192-211.

"

See id. at 309-24.
12See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW EC 1-10 (service recipients) and EC 1-13 (activities by nonlawyers) (McKinney Supp. 2008).
13 DR 1-106, supra note 6; N.Y. JUD. LAW app. EC 1-9-1-12 (McKinney Supp. 2008).
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Essentially, there are three requirements: first, that the recipient of the
services be made aware of any services that are not legal services and hence
are not the subject of an attorney-client relationship; second, that when the
client cannot distinguish between legal services and services that are not
legal services, the rendering of the entirety thereof shall be subject to legal
disciplinary rules; and, third, that none of the lawyers in such an MDP shall
permit the non-lawyers therein to affect the lawyer's professional judgment,
or to compromise the lawyer's professional duties.
The second of the two New York rules adopted in 2001, DR 1-107,
authorizes a lawyer or law firm to enter into and maintain "a contractual
relationship" with a "professional" who is not a lawyer, or a "professional
service firm" that is not a law firm,
for the purpose of offering to the public, on a systematic and
continuing basis, legal services performed by the
4 lawyer or law firm,
as well as other nonlegal professional services.
Three conditions are imposed as prerequisites for this authorization.
First, the other "professional" or "professional service firm" must be in a
profession jointly designated by four New York courts known as the
Appellate Divisions of the Supreme Court, or jointly approved by them
following an application for approval.15 Five professions have been so
designated or approved.
They are: architecture; certified public
accountancy; professional engineering; land surveying; and certified social
work. 16
The second condition imposed by DR 1-107 for authorization to enter
into and maintain a contractual relationship with professionals who are not
lawyers (professionals of one or more of the five types just mentioned)
applies to the lawyer or law firm entering into the relationship. This second
condition is in substance a prohibition applicable to the lawyer or law firm
in question, and is in the form of the following proviso:
provided that [t]he lawyer or law firm neither grants to the [other]
professional or professional service firm, nor permits such person or
firm to obtain, hold or exercise, directly or indirectly, any ownership
or investment interest in, or managerial or supervisory right, power
or position in connection with, the practice of law by the lawyer or
law firm, nor, as provided in DR 2-103(D)(1), shares fees with a
non-lawyer or receives or gives any monetary or other tangible
14DR 1-107, supra note 7; N.Y. JuD. LAW app. EC 1-13-1-18 (McKinney Supp. 2008).
15DR 1-107, supra note 7 at (B) (requiring members of the profession to hold bachelors'
degrees (or the equivalent), to have been licensed by the State of New York, and to be
subject to a code of ethical conduct comparable to the disciplinary rules of the legal
profession's Code of Professional Responsibility).

16N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1205.5 (2008).
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17
benefit for giving or receiving a referral[.]

For this purpose, "ownership or investment interest" is broadly defined
to include "any form of debt or equity," as well as "any interest commonly
considered to be an interest accruing to or enjoyed by an owner or
investor."' 8
The third condition relates to disclosure to clients of the existence of
the contractual relationship. Such disclosure must occur before a client is
referred to the professional service firm that is not a law firm, or before a
client of that firm receives legal services from the lawyer or law firm in
question. In addition, clients must give their "informed written consent" to
the contractual relationship. 19
Thus, the New York rules are stricter where the MDP involves more
than lawyers or law firms providing non-legal services, that is, where the
MDP is not completely under the control of lawyers. If the MDP involves
non-legal professionals or non-legal professional firms not completely
under the control of lawyers, the New York rules permit and require the
MDP to take the form of an on-going contractual relationship. As agreed
between the law firm and its contractual counter-party, namely, the
professional firm that is not a law firm, they may co-ordinate the
simultaneous offering of legal and non-legal services.
Regulatory permission to engage in such an undertaking is, however,
as just discussed, subject to three conditions. The professional firm must be
of a type appearing on a list approved by joint rule of the relevant New
York courts, that is, must be composed of individuals belonging to one of
the five professions mentioned above, and clients must consent to the
arrangement. Most importantly, the lawyers in the MDP are forbidden in
broad terms to permit non-lawyer professionals to have any ownership
interest in the law firm, or to have any managerial or supervisory
responsibilities or rights relating to the legal practice of the law firm.
Specifically mentioned as outside the purview of the non-lawyers in such an
MDP are the following:
* decisions to provide or cease providing legal services;
* the hiring, training and assignment of lawyers;
* pro bono and public interest work;
* financial and budgetary decisions relating to legal practice;
* the compensation and advancement of lawyers and of persons
assisting lawyers on legal matters.2 °

17DR 1-107, supra note 7, at (A)(2).
"8Id. at (B)(2).
'9 Id. at (A)(3).
20 N.Y. JUD. LAW EC 1-13 (McKinney Supp. 2008).
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In addition to these safeguards of the independence of the legal
practice in a New York MDP involving non-lawyer professionals, New
York mandates a further safeguard by requiring that costs and expenses be
allocated between the legal practice, on the one hand, and the activities of
non-lawyer professionals, on the other hand, on a basis that "reasonably
reflects" their respective costs and expenses. 21 In short, the MDP here
permitted by New York is of the "side-by-side" variety, where the law firm
and the professional firm that is not a law firm must co-exist and co-operate
in a manner that gives the law firm a high degree of independence in respect
of the ownership, management, and supervision of its legal practice.
This form of the New York version of MDP not controlled by lawyers
is a "contractual relationship." The "contractual relationship" must be "for
the purpose of offering to the public, on a systematic and continuing basis,
legal services performed by the lawyer or law firm, as well as other
nonlegal professional services .... ,2 2 This purpose has been described as
"a very broad purpose [that] explains the route that New York has taken
regarding multidisciplinary practice., 23 The contractual provisions spelling
out the "contractual relationship" are largely left up to decisions arrived at
by the parties thereto. Considerable flexibility is, therefore, available to the
contracting parties in this New York version of MDP, as long as they
respect the three requirements already mentioned: (1) the non-lawyers
constituting one party must be members of an approved profession; (2) the
lawyers constituting the other party must own and control the entity
practicing law; and (3) clients must be given timely notice of the existence
of, and must consent to, the "contractual relationship."
The New York "contractual relationship" version of MDP can also be
analyzed in terms of the route not taken. The strategic alliances permitted
by New York stop short of allowing the parties to a strategic alliance to
enter into a relationship that would merge and unify the ownership of the
alliance. New York also requires the legal-services party to an alliance to
maintain exclusive managerial control of decision-making relating to the
provision of legal services. (The scope of this managerial exclusivity has
been broadly defined to include the five areas identified in the bullet-points
found two paragraphs above.) Thus, this New York version of MDP does
not encroach on New York's disciplinary rules that forbid lawyers and law
firms to share legal fees with a person who is not a lawyer, and that forbid a
lawyer to enter into a partnership with a person who is not a lawyer if any
of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.2 In other
21DR 1-107, supra note 7, at (D).
22 DR 1-107, supra note 7.
23 ROY SIMON, SIMON'S NEW YORK CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ANNOTATED

140 (Thomson West 2007).
24 NYCRR Title 22, §§

1200.17, 1200.18 [DR 3-102(A), DR 3-103(A)].
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words, New York has not relaxed its rules that forbid both fee-sharing and
partnerships between lawyers and non-lawyers, and has declined to take this
step in order to provide the advantages of MDP without compromising the
independence of the legal profession either in terms of professional
activities or in terms of the financial and managerial control of those
25
activities.
II. NEW YORK AND INVESTMENT IN LEGAL PRACTICE
As has been seen, in New York an MDP that includes the practice of
law either must be entirely owned and controlled by members of the legal
profession, or must take the form of a contractual relationship in which the
practice of law is entirely owned and controlled by members of the legal
profession. As has also been seen, underlying this approach to MDP is the
retention in New York of disciplinary rules that forbid lawyers to share fees
with, or to enter into partnerships with, persons who are not members of the
legal profession. The retention of these rules and the fact that they
expressly received attention when New York's MDP rules were formulated,
without more, indicates that New York has not taken an expansive view of
eligibility to invest in the practice of law. Indeed, in its rules designed to
ensure that lawyers exercise independent professional judgment, New York
has retained a prohibition against legal practice in the form of a for-profit
entity in which a non-lawyer has any ownership interest, or is a member,
corporate director or officer, or otherwise
"has the right to direct or control
26
the professional judgment of a lawyer.
The special committee of the New York State Bar Association that
issued a report in April 2000 on MDP included in its report a section on
non-lawyer investment in entities practicing law. Among the problems
mentioned in that report were the risk of financial dominance, and hence
operational control, of the practice of law by outside investors pursuing
business objectives incompatible with the exercise of independent
professional judgment by members of the legal profession owing undivided
loyalty to clients and to the justice system. In particular, it was thought that
such dominance and control could affect the selection of clients, the manner
in which legal services were rendered to clients, and the allocation of
resources to controversial public interest cases and to pro bono publico
work. 27
When the courts of New York adopted the New York rules on MDP
(as set out above), they may have taken into account the report's concerns
provocative discussion of this prohibition, see Bruce MacEwen et al., Law Firms, Ethics,
and Equity Capital,21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 61 (2008).
25 See SIMON, supra note 23, at 140.
26N.Y. JUD. LAW § 1200.26 [DR 5-107(C)] (McKinney 2008).
27N.Y. REPORT, supra note 3, at 377-88.
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about non-lawyer investment in entities practicing law. In fact, the courts
themselves added to the New York MDP rules a preamble that begins as
follows:
The practice of law has an essential tradition of complete
independence and uncompromised loyalty to those it services.
Recognizing this tradition, clients of lawyers practicing in New York
State are guaranteed 'independent professional judgment and
undivided loyalty uncompromised by conflicts of interest.' Indeed,
these guarantees represent the very foundation of the profession and
allow and foster its continued role as a protector of the system of
law.2 8

In light of this language and its judicial provenance, there would seem
to be a substantial likelihood that any effort to permit non-lawyer
investment in the practice of law in New York would encounter serious
resistance.
III. ENGLAND AND MDP
Recent movement in England toward the authorization of
multidisciplinary practice evolved from official dissatisfaction with the
regulatory framework for legal services. This dissatisfaction underlay the
Labour Government's request for, and is set out in, a report, dated
December 15, 2004, addressed to the Lord Chancellor. The Report was
prepared by Sir David Clementi as Independent Reviewer, and is known as
the Clementi Report. 29 It begins with the U.K. Government's conclusion
that the current regulatory framework for legal services is "outdated,
inflexible, over-complex and insufficiently accountable or transparent"-followed by Sir David's observation that his review had turned up nothing
to cause him "to doubt the broad validity of the Government's
conclusion. 3 °
A comparison with New York seems in order. The New York
Report 31 was concerned with multidisciplinary practice and its place in the
legal rules governing lawyers. American advocates of MDP, while seeking
to legitimize the participation by lawyers in MDP, were not seeking a major
structural modification in the several American states of the system for
regulating and disciplining members of the legal profession. In contrast, the
Clementi Report advocated measures to further such structural ambitions;
they were to encompass the entire regulatory and disciplinary framework
28 DR 1-107, supra note 7, at (A); see also SIMON, supra note 23, at 139.

29David Clementi, Review of the Regulatory Frameworkfor Legal Services in England
and Wales, Final Report (2004) [hereinafter Clementi Report].
30 Id. at 1.
31 See N.Y. REPORT, supra note 3.
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for legal services in England and Wales. Thus, the Clementi Report was to
deal with MDP, if at all, as a topic germane to governmental dissatisfaction
with this overarching framework. Having in fact been covered by the
Clementi Report, MDP apparently was viewed by the Independent
Reviewer either as a topic inherent in general governmental dissatisfaction
with the legal services system, or as a topic ripe for reform in the context of
reforming that system.
True to its mandate, the Clementi Report first advocated the creation
of a new regulatory framework under a new governmental regulator to be
called the Legal Services Board. This recommendation bore fruit in the
U.K. Act, which placed the new Legal Services Board at the apex of a
regulatory framework. Below the Legal Services Board, the Act includes
eight "approved regulators"--notably, the Law Society or Solicitors
Regulatory Authority for solicitors, and the General Council of the Bar for
barristers, as well as six other "approved regulators" for professions like
patent attorneys and trademark attorneys.32
Here, the Clementi Report seems mindful of the creation in the United
Kingdom in the year 2001 of a Financial Services Authority ("FSA") with
jurisdiction over banking, securities firms, and insurance firms, and with
ultimate jurisdiction over so-called front-line regulators-the Bank of
England (for banking), the Securities and Investments Board (for securities3 3
firms), and the Department of Trade and Industry (for insurance firms).
The analogy of regulatory reforms with respect to financial services seems
apt in regard to governmental attitudes in respect of legal services. After
the collapse of a major U.K. bank, Barings, in 1995 was attributed to
inadequate regulation of financial services, the U.K. structure for the
regulation of financial services was completely overhauled by passage of
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and the creation of the FSA.34
Thus, the recent precedent of a two-tiered regulatory approach in the
financial services industry seems to have been influential when the
Clementi Report was drafted to deal with the regulation of legal services. It
would seem reasonable to assume that this influence is traceable to the 2007
U.K. Legal Services Act itself, and helps to explain the detail and
inclusiveness of that legislation.35
The second feature of the Clementi Report was to recommend a new
system for handling complaints brought by consumers of legal services in
32Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, pts. 2, 4, sched. 4 (Eng.).
33 Clementi Report, supra note 29, at 35-36. Technically, the FSA was a continuation of
the Securities and Investments Board.
34 Ailbhe Edgar, Battling the Rogue Trader, LEGAL WEEK, July 10, 2003, available at
http://www.legalweek.com/Articles/ 15559/Battling+the+rogue+trader.html.
35 The U.K. Act is of considerable length: 399 single-spaced pages, comprising (by
unofficial count) 157,649 words.
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respect of one or more members of a legal profession. The Clementi Report
proposed the creation of a new independent body-the Office for Legal
Complaints-to deal with complaints involving practitioners regulated by
the new Legal Services Board. The 2007 U.K. Act duly provides in detail
for the creation and functioning of a new Office for Legal Complaints (this
Office being separate from and in addition to the Board).
Having called for a new Legal Services Board and a new Office for
Legal Complaints, the Clementi Report turned to what it called "alternative
business structures" for the practice of law.3 7 The 2007 U.K. Act, giving
heed to the Report, devotes some forty single-spaced pages to "alternative
business structures" and "ownership of licensed bodies."
Here, one may
perceive a degree of what might be called populist doctrine underlying the
Clementi Report and the resulting legislation. The Report itself, in
discussing MDP, makes reference to concerns of consumer organizations
over "a perceived lack of client care by lawyers"-noting "that these
concerns relate as much to the quality of business service that is provided,
as to the quality of the legal advice itself., 39 MDP, then, was apparently
viewed as part of a new approach to making legal services more responsive
to the needs of consumers.
In this populist drive to assure responsiveness to the needs of
consumers, attention to "the quality of legal advice" may have been
overshadowed by the attention given to ease of access to legal services of
any quality. The Labour Government's Minister for Constitutional Affairs,
Bridget Prentice, received considerable attention when she announced: "I
don't see why consumers should not be able to get legal services as easily
as they can buy a can of beans., 40 This seemed to be an acknowledgment
of the popular use of the term "Tesco Law" as an appellation for the
proposed Legal Services Act-an appellation implying that supermarket
chains would be selling legal services. 4' The minister was also quoted as
saying, in reference to the Co-operative Group, which had shown an interest
in the proposed Legal Services Act: "Perhaps we should call it [the
proposed Act] the Co-op law instead. It sums up the ambition of the Bill
quite well.

42

36 Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, pt. 6, sched. 15 (Eng.).
37Clementi Report, supra note 29, at 105-139 (Ch. F).

38 Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, pt. 5, sched. 13 (Eng.).
39Clementi Report, supra note 29, at 109.
40Frances Gibb, Need Advice? Visit a Supermarket, TIMES (U.K.), May 25, 2006, at 30;

see also Leading the Way with Legal Advice, BRISTOL EVENING POST, Mar. 26, 2007, at 12
(quoting "Legal services minister Bridget Prentice" as saying of the proposed Legal Services
Act: "This will put consumers at the heart of the system").
41 See, e.g., John Duckers, Tesco Presents Threat to Lawyers, BIRMINGHAM POST (U.K.),

June 30, 2006, at 31.
42 Joshua Rozenberg, Putting Justice in the Shop Window, DAILY TELEGRAPH (U.K.),
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IV. ENGLAND AND INVESTMENT IN LEGAL PRACTICE
As mentioned above, the U.K. Legal Services Act 2007 devotes some
forty single-spaced pages.. to,43 "alternative business structures" and
"ownership of licensed bodies.
It appears from these provisions of the
U.K. Act that, to a significant extent, the Act conflates its treatment of MDP
with its treatment of investment in legal practice.
The term
multidisciplinary practice (or MDP) is not of special significance in the Act.
In this respect, the Act seems to adopt a premise that the pursuit of MDP
will occur when an entity that is not a legal practice (an entity called "a
non-authorized person") acquires a "material interest," directly or
indirectly, in a legal practice (called a "licensed body"), if the purpose of
the acquisition is to engage both in the practice of law and in the practice of
some other discipline.
In order for the "non-authorized person" to acquire a material interest
in the "licensed body," approval must be obtained from "the relevant
licensing authority in accordance with the provisions of [Schedule 13 of the
Act]." 4 At this point in the Act's early history, it is not clear how
applications for such approval will in fact be dealt with. In due course,
further regulations can be expected to be issued pursuant to the Act in order
to clarify the procedures that will enable a legal practice in England to
combine with "a non-authorized person" for the purpose of engaging in
multidisciplinary practice. It seems likely that the rules are to be relatively
less stringent for a "low risk body"--meaning a "licensed body" in which
"non-authorized persons" hold less than ten percent of the total ownership
interests.45 In addition, it seems likely that regulation or precedent will
clarify the requirement in the Act that, before the relevant authority grants
approval to a "non-authorized person" to hold an interest in a "licensed
body," the relevant authority must be satisfied, first, that neither the
objectives of the Act nor the duties imposed by the Act will be
compromised, and, second, that the "non-authorized
person.., is otherwise
' '6
a fit and proper person to hold that interest.
The U.K. Act seems to subsume its treatment of multidisciplinary
practice under provisions dealing with the acquisition of a "material
interest" in a legal practice, and these provisions seem to apply both to
MDP and, more broadly, to investment by "non-authorized persons" in
entities practicing law ("licensed bodies"). Does the U.K. Act cover MDP
of the type permitted in New York, where a law firm and a firm in an
approved profession enter into an on-going "contractual arrangement" in
May 25, 2006, at 14.
43 See Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, pt 5, sched. 13 (Eng.).
44Id., pt. 1, sched. 13.
41 Id., § 108.
46 Id., § 6(1), sched. 13.
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the manner described above? 47 The answer under the U.K. Act would seem
to be that its provisions do not apply unless the "contractual arrangement"
is deemed to convey to the non-legal firm a material interest in the practice
of law. In light of the New York prohibition against the non-legal firm
having "any ownership or investment interest in, or managerial or
supervisory right" in the law firm,48 a New York-style "contractual
arrangement" would not appear to require approval pursuant to the U.K.
Act. Only an MDP in which a "non-authorized person" acquired a material
interest in a legal practice would seem to require such approval. Put
differently, MDP under the U.K. Act need not be limited to "side-by-side"
arrangements or strategic alliances as in New York, but MDP that is not so
limited will probably require approval by virtue of the material interest
being acquired by a "non-authorized person" in a "licensed body."
The more serious import, then, of the provisions of the U.K. Act is
that, if approval is granted, "non-authorized persons" may acquire material
investment interests in legal practices ("licensed bodies"). There would
seem to be two general categories of such investment interests. The first
category comprises multidisciplinary practices in which lawyers and nonlawyers are partners in or co-owners of a legal practice. The second
category does not involve MDP, but comprises legal practices in which
non-lawyers pursuing essentially business or financial objectives become
investors in the practice of law. In addition, one can conceive of a third
category combining features of the first two-where the business or
financial investor in a legal practice is also a partner therein. These three
categories will be discussed as, respectively, Category I, Category II, and
Category III investment interests.
The Category I investment interest resembles a departure from a New
York-style "contractual arrangement"-a departure in which the MDP is
not limited to a contractual understanding and is supplemented by nonlawyer ownership or non-lawyer managerial interests of a type forbidden by
New York's Disciplinary Rule 1-107.49 This category of investment
interest might prove attractive for professionals seeking an arrangement
comprising of legal practitioners plus practitioners from one or more other
disciplines. Here, the structure of the arrangement would include profit
sharing or co-ownership allocated to members of each of the disciplines.
As discussed, New York forbids such profit sharing or co-ownership and
does so lest the investment interests of non-legal professionals place them
in a position to influence the practice of law by legal professionals.
Because Category I investment interests could involve similar concerns in
47 See DR 1-107, supra note 7, at (A)(2); N.Y. JuD. LAw EC 1-13-1-18 (McKinney
Supp. 2008).
48 DR 1-107, supra note 7, at (A)(2).
49 See id. The terms Category I, II, III are the author's.
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England, it is conceivable that further regulations and decisions under the
2007 U.K. Act will include measures designed to safeguard the professional
independence of lawyers practicing in a Category I context.
Category II is both radically different from Category I and a category
that embraces a congeries of possibilities. Here, non-lawyers investing in
legal practices are not seeking to practice a discipline in a multidisciplinary
practice, but are, conceptually, seeking to cross the line from MDP into
investment in legal practice as a means of furthering business or financial
objectives. Such an objective may be to broaden the range of merchandise
offered to customers-in the words of the Minister quoted above, to enable
consumers "to get legal services as easily as they can buy a can of beans. 50
Thus, the Category II business objective could be to sell multiple lines of
products and services, of which legal services would be but one.
The Category II objective could, however, be quite different from the
one just described. For example, the objective could be to make a portfolio
investment in a legal practice that is an ongoing concern, or to make a
similar investment when a legal practice is being launched. The seller of
the investment might be one or more current owners of a legal practice, and
the buyer might be an outside investor hoping to achieve a good return on
the investment. In some cases, the seller may be seeking to liquidate-to
"cash out"-an interest (or a portion of an interest) in the legal practice. If
the seller is a retired (or about-to-retire) member of the legal practice, the
seller could be seeking to finance the seller's retirement from legal practice.
In effect, the seller may seek a certain monetary amount for this purpose,
and future generations of lawyers in the legal practice would have the
burden of providing a return to the buyer who had made a corresponding
investment in the legal practice.
If the Category II objective were to help launch a new legal practice or
the expansion of an existing legal practice, with one or more outside
investors providing capital for the new legal practice or the expansion, the
portion of outside capital being provided would obviously be relevant to the
degree of control exercisable by outsiders. The ratio of capital provided by
outsiders as compared to the capital contributed by the legal practitioners
themselves could be as agreed among the participants, and could vary from
time to time as dictated by investor/practitioner decisions and by the
success (or lack thereof) of the new or expanded practice itself over time.
There has been considerable commentary on the types of legal practices that
might seek outside investors l These legal practices can be classified as
three types of firms in England and Wales: (1) small firms; (2) "high street"
50 See text accompanying supra note 40.
51 See, e.g.,

SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTH., LEGAL SERVICES ACT: NEW FoRMS OF
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(2007), available at http://www.sra.org.uk/securedownload/file

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

28:415 (2008)

firms, meaning regional or moderate-sized firms; or (3) "magic circle"
firms, meaning the largest London firms with both domestic and
international practices. Until further regulations are issued and actual
experience is had under the 2007 legislation, it may be too early to make
useful predictions in this regard. Conceivably, the so-called "magic circle"
firms will not want to be beholden to outside investors; some "high street"
firms might find outside investment attractive; and small firms might find it
relatively difficult to attract outside investment.52
Category III involves a non-lawyer professional participant in an
MDP. Here, the non-lawyer participant is endeavoring, for marketing
purposes, to turn its own professional organization into a more broadly
based and, if possible, more profitable operation. Two examples are a bank
or an accounting firm that seeks to add legal practice to the services that it
can offer its clients. Conceptually, Category III has elements of both
Category I and Category II. For this reason, the analysis of a given
Category III investment interest can reveal not only professional features,
but also motives arising from hoped-for market opportunities.
An
observer's reaction to a given Category III investment interest is likely to
turn on which is emphasized-the professional features, or the search for
marketing opportunities. 53 Balancing these aspects of a proposed Category
III investment interest under the 2007 U.K. Act will be the province of
implementing legislation and the domain of the regulators created by the
Act and, as work progresses under the Act, the meaning of the statute in this
area may be clarified. More particularly, as additional regulations and
rulings become available in respect to any of the categories under
discussion, it may become possible to answer with some certainty what
types of investment interests in "licensed bodies" do not compromise the
objectives of the Act or the duties imposed thereby, as well as the types of
investors that will be deemed "fit and proper" to hold such investment
interests.5 4
At this point, it seems appropriate to note an apparent difference
between the Clementi Report and the 2007 U.K. Act with respect to
alternative business structures for the practice of law. The Clementi Report
introduced two terms:
0 the Legal Disciplinary Practice ("LDP") that brings together legal
practitioners from two or more legal disciplines, for example, an
52 See N.Y. REPORT, supra note 3, at 377-80. See also Michael Peel, Slater & Gordon in

A$35m Legal Listing First, FIN.

TIMES,

May 21, 2007, at 20, available at http://search.ft

.com/ftArticle?queryText=%22COMPANIES%3A+INTERNATIONAL%3A+Slater+%26+
Gordon%22&y=0&aje=false&x=0&id=070521000747&ct=O&nclickcheck=1 (listing by a
"niche" Australian firm of A$35 million of its shares).
53 See text accompanying supra note 11.
54 See text accompanying supra note 46.
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LDP comprising barristers and solicitors who provide legal
services to third parties; and
the Multi-Disciplinary Practice ("MDP") that brings together
lawyers and other professionals to provide legal and other services
to third parties.
The Clementi Report viewed authorizing the LDP as a step toward
later authorizing MDP "if at some subsequent moment it were determined
that there were appropriate safeguards to permit [Multi-Disciplinary
Practice]. 55 Indeed, the Independent Reviewer reported the existence of an
"overwhelming sentiment... that it would be a good start to get lawyers
working together in LDPs, and to assess the regulatory consequences of
that, before proceeding with MDPs. ' 56 This cautionary approach did not,
however, find its way into the 2007 U.K. Act itself.
The Clementi Report's caution regarding MDP in England was
complemented by the Report's cautious views expressed concerning
conflicts of interest between non-lawyer investors, on the one hand, and the
clients of lawyers conducting legal practice, on the other. The Clementi
Report said that the regulators of legal practice should handle potential
problems arising from such conflicts of interest, and warned against
permitting a situation to arise "where an outside owner has an adverse
interest [adverse to a client] in the legal outcome." Outside owners, the
Report added, should not be allowed to "interfere in individual client cases
or have access to client files or other information about individual cases."
In short, according to the Report, "[o]utside
owners... must be cleared by
' 57
the regulatory authorities as 'fit to own.'
It remains to be seen how the "fit to own" standard will be developed
and enforced in England. The standard seems to call for considerable
regulatory attention. It will almost surely prove more complex to interpret
and apply than the limited criteria applicable in New York, where only
lawyer-controlled MDP or "contractual relationships" between lawyers and
non-lawyers are permitted, where the non-lawyers must come from a few
approved professions, and where the relevant lawyers and law firms are
strictly prohibited from permitting any non-lawyer ownership interest or
managerial role in the practice of law.
V. ENGLAND AND NEW YORK: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
As discussed above, New York looked at MDP and the question of
non-lawyer investment in legal practice as matters to be resolved within the

55 Clementi Report, supra note 29, at 9-10.
56

Id. at 137.

57 Id. at 121, 124.
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pre-existing basic framework of the law governing lawyers.58 In New York,
this law is the responsibility of the courts, including the four courts known
as the Appellate Divisions of the Supreme Court,5 9 and, as discussed above,
on "an essential tradition of
these four courts have focused primarily
60
complete independence" of lawyers.
The United Kingdom's Labour Government took a different approach.
Its position was that the existing basic law governing the legal professions
needed fundamental revision. 6 1 The U.K. Parliament gave expression to
this position by enacting the 2007 Legal Services Act. These developments
seem to suggest long-term popular dissatisfaction with major features of the
English legal system, such as its lack of responsiveness to consumer
complaints, and its need for changes designed to render it more accessible.62
England seems less inclined than New York to defer to the courts to
oversee the legal system, and seems more inclined than New York to utilize
extra-judicial governmental activism as a response to perceived
shortcomings in the legal system. There is a clear contrast: New York's
judiciary seems to attach substantial importance to maintaining the
independence of the system, while the English attitude appears to be one of
greater willingness to look to governmental reform in response to popular
demand. As between the two jurisdictions, then, there may be cultural
differences when it comes to demarking the proper sphere of government.
What has been viewed in England as the proper sphere of government
in the context of the legal system? If one goes back to mid-nineteenth
century England, one finds philosophical discussion of the question. In his
The Proper Sphere of Government, Herbert Spencer rejected most
arguments for governmental activism, but was quite outspoken on the need
for governmental activism in respect to the legal system.63 Admittedly,
Herbert Spencer is a very special commentator, and is probably best-known
in the United States for dictum in a dissent by Justice Holmes: "[t]he
Fourteenth Amendment
federal Constitution] does not enact Mr.
, • [to the
•
,,64
Even so, to have a commentator like
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.
58 See text accompanying supra notes 4-8.

59
60
61
62
63

See, e.g., N.Y. RULES OF COURT, §§ 603, 691, 806, 1022 (McKinney 2007).
See text accompanying supra note 29.
See text accompanying supra note 31.
See text accompanying supra notes 36 and 40.
Herbert Spencer, The Proper Sphere of Government, THE NON-CONFORMIST (1842-

43) (originally published as a series of twelve letters), available at www.econlib.org
/library/LFBooks/Spencer/spnMvS6.html.
64 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (dissenting from the Court's 5-4 holding
that a state could not constitutionally legislate maximum working hours). Although
Spencer's treatise SOCIAL STATICS did not include his The ProperSphere of Government, the
latter resembled much of the former in arguing against governmental activism in such areas
as public welfare and public education.
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Herbert Spencer, who generally opposed governmental activism, call for
governmental activism as regards to the legal system can be said to be a
striking illustration of English willingness to consider extra-judicial reform
of the legal system. In The ProperSphere of Government, Herbert Spencer

wrote as follows about the "the toiling artisan" and "the exercise of his
rights and privileges":
Does [the government] ...

fully and fairly administer the laws?

Does it send forth its officers, commanding them diligently to secure
to every one.., that protection.., which he has sacrificed so much
to obtain? Does it take up the cause of the poor man, and defend him
against the aggressions of his rich neighbour? No! [I]t does none of
these things. It turns over the complainant to the tender mercies of
solicitors, attorneys, barristers, and a whole legion of law officers. It
drains his purse with charges for writs, briefs, affidavits, subpoenas,
fees of all kinds, and expenses innumerable. It involves him in all
the mazy intricacies of common courts, chancery courts, suits,
counter-suits, and appeals; and thousands of times it has
overwhelmed with irretrievable ruin, the man whose person and
property it was bound to defend.65
If one makes suitable adjustment for nineteenth-century rhetorical
flourishes, one sees but a short, incremental discursive distance between the
foregoing exhortation by Herbert Spencer and the government-inspired
introduction to the twenty-first-century Clementi Report decrying "the
current regulatory framework" as "outdated, inflexible, over-complex and
insufficiently accountable or transparent." 66 The cultural bias against the
legal system in England may have been brewing for a very long time. The
U.K. Parliament having enacted the Labour Government's proposed
remedies for this state of affairs, this article will now turn to the
implications for international legal practice of the different approaches in
England and New York to questions bearing on multidisciplinary practice
and outside investment in legal practice.
VI. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENT ENGLISH
AND NEW YORK RULES
As discussed above, New York has had in place for several years its
rules on multidisciplinary practice, and has left in place its long-standing
rules prohibiting outside investment in legal practice. Also, as discussed
above, the United Kingdom, in respect of England and Wales, adopted
legislation in 2007 that now awaits regulatory implementation in order to
provide for multidisciplinary practice and to deal with investment by non65 Spencer, supra note 63, at 33-34 (Letter number X).

66 See text accompanying supra note 31.
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lawyers in legal practice. Once this process of implementation has been
completed, the rules in England and New York are almost certain to be
substantially different, and this factor of substantial regulatory differences
could make for uncertainty in the arena of international legal practice. It
does not seem too soon to inquire into the differences that may emerge, and
the possibility of reconciling those differences.
For this purpose, the newly permitted categories of investment activity
in England, as discussed above, will be used.
Category I is an MDP in which lawyers and non-lawyer professionals
are partners or co-owners.
Category II is a legal practice in which outside investors that are not
professionals or are not acting as professionals invest in the legal
practice to further investment or business objectives of the investors or
of the legal practice or of both.
Category III is an MDP in which non-lawyer professionals participate
to further their own marketing objectives. Category III is permitted in
New York only if the MDP is a New York-style strategic alliance in
which the non-lawyer professionals are from one or more approved
professions.6 8
Category III bis refers to Category III investment activities that are not
permitted in New York.
For purposes of this analysis, two geographical locations, England
(called "Eng" in the table) and New York (called "NY" in the table), will be
used. In addition, two types of legal practice will be used: a law firm based
in London (called the "L firm" in the table) which also has a presence in
New York; and a law firm based in Manhattan (called the "M firm" in the
table) which also has a presence in England. In tabular form, the elements
of this analysis can be outlined as indicated below. The purpose of the
analysis is to indicate the rules appropriate for each of the sixteen situations
indicated by the "L" and "M" boxes in the table. (To repeat-the analysis
will deal with neither the London firm that is in England but not New York,
nor the Manhattan firm that is in New York but not England, and will
assume that the London firm also has a presence in New York, and that the
Manhattan firm also has a presence in England.)

67 See text accompanying supra notes 49-54.
68

See text accompanying supra notes 15-20.
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Category

I

L firm in Eng
Permitted if
approved by
Legal Services
Board or front-

M firm in NY

L firm in NY

M firm in Eng

Not permitted

Not permitted

Probably not
permitted [see
text below]

line regulator

Same as for I
above

Same as for I
above
Same as for I
above

Not permitted

Not permitted

Probably not
permitted

Permitted if a *
"side-by-side"
DR 1-107
*
relationship

Subject to in text
discussion
belo
if
below,
permitted
"side-by-side"
DRifa
1sip
1- 107 relationship

Permitted if a
"side-by-side"
DR 1-107
D
-0
relationship

Not permitted

Probably not
permitted

Not permitted
I

On the basis of the U.K. 2007 statute alone and in advance of
implementing regulations becoming available thereunder, it seems clear that
a London firm in England will be permitted to carry out in England the
activities represented by all of Categories I, II, and III, including III bis, so
long as the presence of the London firm in New York does not create a
problem. Because, however, these are not permitted activities for a
Manhattan firm in New York, they will in all likelihood not be permitted
when undertaken by a New York branch or affiliate of the London firm. A
more difficult question arises when the London firm's New York branch or
affiliate does not itself engage in any of the Category I, II or III bis
activities, and they are not undertaken by the London firm except in
London. In this event, will the New York branch or affiliate be in violation
of New York rules by virtue of the London firm engaging in those
activities? Put differently-will the London firm be able to avoid
attribution of its London activities to its New York branch or affiliate,
inasmuch as those London activities would be violative of New York rules
if they occurred in New York?
Here we have a key question that touches on all eight of the boxes in
the two "L firm" columns-the boxes pertaining to the London firm-and
that might touch on the other boxes (the Manhattan firm boxes) as well if
the Manhattan firm had an English branch or affiliate engaged in Category
I, II or III bis activities in England. The question turns on the extent to
which, for New York regulatory purposes, a firm's legal practice can be
compartmentalized as between England and New York. Regulators in New
York might assert that, realistically, a law firm cannot be viewed as isolated
compartments. So arguing, the New York regulators might take the
position that a law firm with an establishment in London, be it a London
firm or a Manhattan firm, must be viewed as the sum of all of its ostensible
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geographical parts, because, in dealing with the public, the firm can be
expected to hold itself out as a cohesive worldwide entity or group of
entities, bringing to its legal practice its global resources as needed to deal
with particular assignments from individual clients. If, at some point, the
New York regulators were to adopt this reasoning for a London firm, they
might then feel constrained to apply the same reasoning to a Manhattan
firm that, through its establishment in England, engaged in any of the
activities in Category I, II or III bis.
It is too soon to know if the relevant regulators will take the position
just outlined, or if there are forms of affiliation that would produce a
different result and avoid attribution of Category I, II or III bis activities
from the London part of a legal practice to the Manhattan part. To the
extent that analogous regulatory information is available, it suggests that
such attribution is conceivable. For example, in New York, attorneys may
be disciplined for misconduct in foreign jurisdictions, and the London
activities
just mentioned might be contrary to New York's disciplinary
69
rules.

Generally, regulatory authorities can be expected to look to their own
domestic law to resolve domestic questions arising in respect of the 2007
U.K. Act.
The German legal-services regulatory authority (the
Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer) has announced that structures permitted
under the U.K. 2007 legislation may be illegal under German law, and that
a law firm that adopted such a structure might be prohibited from practicing
in Germany. 70 Although the New York courts have not taken a position as
to what they might do, the possibility exists that, faced with a concrete case
involving a law practice that has a presence in both New York and England
and that engages in Category I, II or III bis activities in England, a New
York court would arrive at a result similar to the reported views of the
Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer.
At this point, then, the prudent course would seem to be to assume that
a London firm with operations in New York would run afoul of New York
law if it took advantage of the outside investments permitted under the 2007
U.K. Act, or if it engaged in multidisciplinary practice other than as
permitted under New York law. By analogy, in the case of a New York
firm with an establishment in London, it would seem prudent to assume that
its Manhattan establishment would be subject to discipline in New York if
See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 603.3 (2008) ("Discipline of
Attorneys for Professional Misconduct in Foreign Jurisdiction").
70 U.K. Parliament Joint Committee on the Draft Services Bill, Volume I: Report, 20052006, HC 1154-I (Memorandum by the President of the Bundesrechtsanwaltskammep). See
also German Regulator Threatens MDPs with Disbarment, THE LAWYER (U.K.), Nov. 6,
2006, at 29, available at http://www.thelawyer.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=122833&d=l l&h=
24&f=23.
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the firm's London establishment engaged in investment or professional
activities that would not be permitted in New York. As a consequence, it
would seem that the New York firm's London establishment should
conduct itself in London only as permitted by disciplinary rules applicable
to the firm in New York.
Another reason for prudence might be a firm's potential liability in
civil litigation in New York. For example, a client might claim injury
resulting from a conflict of interest caused by an outside investment in a
legal practice of a type not permitted in New York, or attributable to a form
of MDP that was inconsistent with New York's disciplinary rules. In any
event, until the regulatory groundwork has been completed pursuant to the
2007 U.K. Act, potential liability in New York for taking advantage of that
law is likely to remain a matter of conjecture. Accordingly, while the
sixteen regulatory boxes in the table six paragraphs above can be identified,
it may be too early to complete them other than by indicating that activities
inconsistent with New York's disciplinary rules may prove problematic.
Admittedly, it is not very helpful simply to use the word "problematic"
when it comes to the regulation of MDP and rules relating to permissible
outside investment in legal practice, and to leave the matter there. The
conduct of a legal practice necessarily involves planning for the future and
anticipating permissible and impermissible future activity. The practice of
law is competitive, and the risk-reward aspects of different areas of legal
practice, not to mention different potential sources of investment capital for
legal practice, call for appraisal on an ongoing basis.
When two
international legal centers as important as England and New York become
mutually "problematic" with respect to recent regulatory developments, the
cross-border practice of law can be seriously inhibited or threatened. It
therefore seems important to address as soon as possible the problematic
areas that can now be identified, and to address them with a view to finding
at an early date possible ways to reconcile the regulatory questions that
have arisen. Unless this is done, the unresolved international aspects of the
2007 U.K. legislation may prove needlessly inhibitive, not to mention
unhappily costly if they are left to the occurrence and outcome of public
enforcement and private litigation.
VII. RECONCILING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ENGLAND AND
NEW YORK
One of the sections in the rules in the 2007 U.K. Act uses the term
"foreign bodies." This section relates to "alternative business structures"
and authorizes the Lord Chancellor "to make provision for the
modification" of the rules as they apply to "a body of persons formed under
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or... recognized by... law having effect outside England and Wales. 7 1
Presumably, this section has been included in the statute to deal with its
possible extraterritorial application to entities that are not English "licensed
bodies," that is, are law firms whose existence is based on non-U.K. law.
The English establishments of New York law firms would thus seem to fall
within this section. In addition, the provision would seem to apply to a
New York establishment of an English law firm if that establishment is
"formed under" or "recognized by" New York law. Accordingly, it seems
conceivable that the Lord Chancellor might take into account extraterritorial
establishments set up outside England by or on behalf of legal practices
based in England, as well as establishments set up in England by legal
practices based abroad.
One possible way the Lord Chancellor could deal with extraterritorial
concerns would be to take cognizance of the New York rules on MDP and
outside investment, and to issue a formal regulation to give effect to
requests by English law firms having (or planning to have) establishments
in New York. Thus, on proper application to the Lord Chancellor, such a
firm would be in a position to seek to render inoperative as to that firm
those provisions of the 2007 U.K. Act that could prove problematic in the
context of the firm's New York establishment. More particularly, if an
English firm elected to take advantage of such a regulation, the English firm
would ask the Lord Chancellor to recognize the firm's formal renunciation
of its U.K. statutory rights (1) to enter into multidisciplinary arrangements
and (2) to secure investment by outside non-lawyer investors. Such an
officially recognized renunciation might, in the case of the English firm in
question, deal effectively with the matters mentioned under "L firm in NY"
in the table found nine paragraphs above.
The approach here suggested would leave it up to each individual
English firm to decide whether it wanted to cut itself off from certain types
of MDP and/or certain types of outside investment available under the 2007
U.K. Act. By successful application to the Lord Chancellor, the English
firm would simultaneously cut itself off from certain types of MDP and/or
outside investment and, in so doing, would free itself to create or maintain
an establishment in New York. If, on the other hand, the English firm was
not inclined to take these steps, it-simply by doing nothing in the way of
renunciation-would retain access under the U.K. Act to MDP and outside
investment of the kinds violative of New York rules. The reciprocal effect
could also be true, however: by doing nothing in the way of renunciation,
the English firm might be electing to forego the creation or maintenance of
a New York establishment. (As for New York firms with establishments in
England, see the text three paragraphs below.)
A major factor driving the analysis is that, of the two jurisdictions,
71 U.K. Act § 109 ("Foreign bodies"), supra note 2.
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England and New York, the latter has the stricter rules both on MDP and on
outside, non-lawyer investment in legal practices. So long as an English
firm with a New York establishment makes certain that its worldwide
operations conform to New York rules on MDP and outside investment, it
should not run afoul of those rules. The English firm, in conforming with
New York rules by renouncing certain rights under U.K. law, will of course
be applying the New York rules outside New York-in England and,
possibly, in third countries. For the English firm, a solution that means
giving extraterritorial application to New York rules might be deemed
inappropriate as a matter of principle, but the consequence of having two
sets of rules that might apply is, not surprisingly, that the stricter set of rules
prevails. In addition, having the New York rules prevail in the sense just
discussed does not seem unfair. They were in existence and well known
when the 2007 U.K. Act was being debated, and they thus were part of the
regulatory terrain that the U.K. legislators had fair opportunity to assess.
New York has the stricter set of rules because, regarding MDP, either
the MDP must be controlled by lawyers, or it must be a "side-by-side"
contractual arrangement between a legal practice and another professional
practice, wherein the legal practice is prohibited from permitting any
ownership interests or managerial rights to be acquired or exercised by nonlawyers. New York also has the stricter set of rules as regards outside
investors, because lawyers in New York are forbidden to share fees or to
enter into partnerships with non-lawyers. If the legal practice takes place in
both England and New York, the English side of the practice either might
engage in MDP that is not subject to prohibitions as strict as those in New
York, or might have access to outside investment that is tantamount to feesharing or partnership of a type prohibited in New York. If such an event
were to occur, the ownership or managerial or investment rights that are
permitted in England but prohibited in New York might be attributed to the
New York operation, on the theory that the English and New York legal
practices were in key respects a single unified legal practice. The result
would be a violation of New York rules arising because of MDP or outside
investment authorized by the 2007 U.K. Act. This possible result explains
the suggestion made above: to avoid such a result, an English firm should
have the capacity to lodge with the Lord Chancellor a renunciation of some
or all of the firm's rights under the 2007 U.K. Act to engage in MDP or to
receive outside investment from non-lawyer sources.
A New York firm with an establishment in England would present
problems mirroring those just discussed. The English establishment
presumably would have the right to engage in English-style MDP or to
receive investment from non-lawyer outside sources. The New York firm
would thus be at risk of violating New York's rules on MDP and outside
investment, because its English and New York entities could be deemed
parts of a single unit or of a cohesive operational group. Accordingly, it is
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suggested that the New York firm, on behalf of its English establishment,
be given the same rights as those proposed in the preceding paragraphs for
an English firm. Thus, the New York firm, on behalf of its English
establishment, would have the right to lodge with the Lord Chancellor the
same type of renunciation discussed above. In this manner, the New York
firm would seek to avoid problems under the relevant New York rules that
might arise by virtue of the existence of its English establishment. In the
same manner, the matters mentioned under "M firm in Eng ''72 might be
dealt with effectively.
Perhaps the provision for renunciations suggested above should
provide that they will be effective for a substantial term of years, but need
not be perpetual, to give the relevant legal practices an opportunity, on the
basis of both their own experience and experience generally with the 2007
U.K. Act, to reconsider their options from time to time. At the present time,
the lodging of renunciations does not seem unlikely in the case of large
international law firms-that is, the so-called "magic circle" firms in
England, as well as similar firms based in New York. A number of them
might well be immediately willing to forego English-style MDP and to
commit themselves to internal sources for financing their practices without
having recourse to outside non-lawyer investors. While that could be the
picture today, it might be unnecessary to tie the hands of any category of
legal practices indefinitely, and it might be acceptable to allow every legal
practice a chance to evaluate from time to time the feasibility and
desirability of following the routes being charted under the 2007 U.K. Act.
On the other hand, as mentioned, a renunciation might well have to be for a
substantial term of years, in order to lend credibility to a claim that a firm
was in compliance with the New York prohibitions relevant to MDP and
outside financing.
The provision for renunciations suggested above rests on sound policy
affecting the international practice of law. It would be unfortunate if the
2007 U.K. Act had the result of inhibiting English law firms from
practicing in New York, or New York firms from practicing in England.
Not only have the dynamics of cross-border practice been well developed in
both jurisdictions, but also international legal centers and international legal
practice all over the world have benefited from innovations developed by
law firms with establishments in those two jurisdictions.
As mentioned above, the 2007 U.K. Act contains the concept of a "low
risk body"-meaning a "licensed body" in which "non-authorized persons"
hold less than 10% of the total ownership interests.7 3 This suggests that
some "low risk" concept might be used to reconcile the applicability of the
new 2007 U.K. Act to the generally stricter New York approach to MDP
72See Table, supra at 432-33.

73 See text accompanying supra note 45.
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and outside investment in legal practice. The concept of less than 10%
being "low risk" seems open to question, however. In context, the meaning
of "low risk" in the U.K. Act is that if one or more outside non-lawyer
investors hold less than a 10% ownership interest in a legal practice, that
outside ownership interest is "low risk" in terms of the ability of the legal
practice to function in accordance with recognized professional norms.
Suppose, however, that there are 100 equal ownership interests in a
legal practice, that nine of them are held by a financial institution with total
assets in the billions of pounds sterling, and that the remaining ninety-one
ownership interests are ninety-one individual interests, each held by one of
the legal practitioners in the legal practice, none of whom has significant
assets other than a one one-hundredth individual interest in the legal
practice. Let us suppose further that the institutional holder of the 9%
interest is a major client of the legal practice. If a dispute arises concerning
another client of the firm in which, arguably, the institutional holder has a
conflict of interest with that other client, it seems likely that the 9% interest
of the institutional holder could weigh heavily in the resolution of the
dispute, and it does not seem impossible that recognized professional norms
might be bent to favor the holder of the 9% interest. However that may be,
the point is that bright-line mathematical formulas are not easy to develop
when it is a matter of individual legal practitioners competing with outside
investors in reaching answers to difficult professional questions.
Furthermore, the more professional the question, the more risky the
putative "low risk" outside interest may be. The legal practitioners may
want to take on, for a non-paying client, a controversial public interest
assignment of a type deemed important to the dispensing of legal justice.
The outside investor in a legal practice may be concerned with the rate of
return on its investment to the exclusion of considerations of legal justice
for non-paying clients. Again, bright-line mathematical formulas may not
prove helpful.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Adapting to the new 2007 U.K. Act and reconciling regulatory
differences between England and New York are essentially dependent on
the private practice of law in the international arena. It is the private
practitioners who will have to deal with the regulatory landscape as it
changes in light of legislative and other changes. In all likelihood, these
practitioners will devise appropriate structures for engaging in
complementary English and New York legal practices. As seen from
England, the 2007 U.K. Act, by recognizing the need to make provisions
for "foreign bodies," may inspire international practitioners to propose rules
that will not put their overseas establishments at risk, be they in New York
or elsewhere. As seen from New York, where the emphasis has been on
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maintaining the independence of the practice of law, many firms are already
familiar with pursuing both the objective of professional independence and
the objective underlying the 2007 U.K. Act of assuring that the legal system
is accessible to the consumers of legal services. These objectives need not
be in conflict, and it will be the task of practicing legal professionals to
avoid needless conflict and to find ways to advance both objectives
harmoniously.

